The
ritual thesis was not dismissed despite the heavy criticism aimed at
the CSA. Contrary to expectations, while obsolete arguments were replaced
by alternative ones, the main thesis remained firm. Ernest T. Kirby
suggested a ritual theory on the grounds of development of theatre from
the ecstatic nature of shamanist ritual.(33) From the viewpoint of the
creation of the theatre medium, it would appear that Kirby's approach
is advantageous. Whereas the CSA focused on shared narrative elements
of ritual and dramatic fictional world, Kirby focused on a performer
exhibiting an identity other than his own, apparently characteristic
of both the shaman in a state of trance and the actor on stage. This
alleged common property would appear to be more promising, since enacting
characters is essential to acting in all dramatic media.
The
term "shaman", of Siberian origin and originally employed
in Siberian ethnography, is applied nowadays in the study of different
cultures to a variety of medicine men who combine healing, magic and
mediumship. The common belief is that the shaman is capable of entering
a state of trance, travelling to other worlds, taking control of spirits
and compelling them to cure people in the human world. The success of
the shaman is measured by his mastery of the upper-worlds and, in this
sense, it is a kind of (magic) ritual.
In
the state of trance the shaman behaves as if possessed by a spirit,
speaking in his voice. The belief is that in order to reveal itself
within the human world the spirit is in need of the material body of
the shaman. In this sense, he is a medium of this spiritual power. This
quality is essential to Kirby's theory, because the shaman is supposed
to "enact" an entity other than himself, a denizen of another
world; and this is assumed to establish him as the prototype of the
[page 120] theatre actor.
Despite
its wide appeal, this approach is nevertheless fallacious, since it
overlooks the internal viewpoint of the culture within which the shaman
performs. The mere thought that the shaman is simply "acting"
implies that magical means are not effective and cannot influence the
world, in particular its ruling powers. From this internal perspective
the shaman is definitely not enacting the character of a spirit, but
constitutes a means for its revelation in the human world; i.e., the
spirit is not conceived as a fictional entity, but as a real one. He
is not describing a spirit, but becomes inhabited by the spirit itself.
The shaman performs a ritual macro-act whose purpose is to change a
state of affairs in the human world with the assistance of super-natural
powers. The shaman believes that he is capable of coercing spirits to
speak through his mouth and that he can serve as a medium for them,
and so does the community. The spirit is assumed to eventually control
the shaman and from this moment on its behavior is his own. The efficacy
of the ritual is supposed to depend on these beliefs. If the shaman
is suspected of impersonation by the community, his performance is conceived
as fraud and the efficacy of the ritual is impaired.
In
contrast, an actor genuinely enacts a (fictional) character. By means
of performing verbal and non-verbal images, which he imprints on his
own body, he creates a text, a description of a character, which reaches
existence only in the imagination of the spectator. Throughout his performance
on stage he consistently preserves the duality actor/character, which
cannot be cancelled without becoming something else. The audience accepts
the basic convention of theatre that an actor enacts a character, displaying
indexes of action that reflects, not on himself but on the enacted other.
Therefore, the nature of his performance cannot be perceived as fraud,
but as essential to his art. Whereas the shaman's performance can be
conceived in terms of "honest" or "fraudulent",
the actors' performance can not.
[page
121] Even if we do not accept the internal viewpoint of the
shamanist believer, and prefer a skeptical scientific approach, the
principles of representation do not change. For example, from a psychoanalytical
viewpoint, the thesis is that in a situation of trance the shaman reflects
potential entities and voices suppressed in his own unconscious. In
this sense, from this viewpoint too, he does not enact an "other",
but expresses the "other" suppressed in his own soul; he enacts
nothing, because this "other" enjoys real existence. Thus
trance is assumed to only reflect the non-I of the shaman himself. Consequently,
whether the approach to shamanism is internal or external is immaterial:
in any case the "other" is conceived as real. In contrast,
in creating images on stage, for the sake of describing a character,
the theatre actor may draw inspiration from the contents of his own
psyche, including suppressed ones, but he cannot transcend the boundaries
of his medium: he does not express a character, but describes it. Moreover,
an actor can describe the character of a shaman, or even a spirit, but
the shaman cannot describe or even express an actor.
The
problem resides in conceiving ecstasy as a condition of theatre acting.
Even in the state of extreme identification with a character, the basic
duality actor/character is not and can not be abolished. Furthermore,
at most, this type of identification can be conceived as a quality of
a particular acting style. Indeed, Kirby's approach definitely recalls
the naturalistic style, in the vein of Stanislavski, which presupposes
that the actor has to get under the skin of his character, as if he
were possessed by it. Obviously, this is a metaphorical way of speaking,
since, being figments of the imagination, fictional characters have
no real skin: their fictional "existence" is conjured up by
the very fact of being enacted. Moreover, it is very difficult to imagine
and believe that every evening an actor enters a kind of state of trance.
This assumption does not suit even naturalism, which is quite a marginal
style in the history of theatre. Possession cannot be a necessary condition
for theatre acting.
[page
122] Although the shaman's activity focuses on the cure of
an individual patient, the ritual act takes place within a community
of believers and inside a well-delimited space, such as a building or
enclosed open space. From an external viewpoint, therefore, the impression
is that in the state of trance, the shaman "performs" in front
of an "audience" in a "theatre". Accordingly, the
transition from ritual to theatre is supposed to happen when the belief
in the shaman's capability to dominate the spirits weakens and/or the
involvement of the community in the ritual act decreases, even if they
still respect his art. It is indeed possible that in such a process
of decline, shamans mobilize all kinds of gimmicks, what Kirby terms
"para-theatrical" acts, for intensifying the effect of their
performances. Under such conditions, the community of believers is supposed
to gradually change into an audience, while the functional element of
the ritual gradually disappears.(34) In this sense, this theory is not
different from that of the CSA, with the creation of theatre being conceived
as the outcome of a process of disintegration of a certain kind of ritual.
The question is, therefore, whether or not in the state of deterioration
a ritual still preserves its nature, so that it can be said that it
generates the art of theatre? This is probably a necessary assumption
for any theory of ritual origin of theatre, since it needs a phase in
which ritual loses its essential characteristics in order to assume
new ones.
Furthermore,
in its correct functioning, the ritual community does not participate
in the shamanist act in the same way as in a theatre performance. It
forms a community of believers on whose faith the efficacy of the ritual
act depends. In general, there is "participation" in both
shamanist ritual and theatre, but its meaning is completely different
in each of these domains. In ritual "participation" means
involvement in the communal effort to change a state of affairs on a
divine level for the sake of a patient's cure. In the theatre, in contrast,
it means involvement [page 123] in
sharing a communal form of thinking, and experiencing the potentialities
of the human nature.
In
his attempt to devise a unitary theory, and in order to assimilate the
tradition of theatre originating in pagan Dionysiac ritual, Kirby suggested
that the latter was also a particular form of shamanism.(35) Although
the ecstatic character of Dionysiac faith supported this thesis, the
main features of shamanism were missing in it.
In
conclusion, Kirby's effortful theoretical attempt infused new life into
the basic thesis of the CSA, by merely changing the line of argumentation.
The crucial difference between them resides in the addition of the performative
element, which transforms Kirby's approach into a genuine theory of
creation of the theatre medium. However, as we have shown, this theory
too does not stand up to criticism. If this is true, it is indeed a
matter of wonder why it still continues to enjoy extreme popularity
among contemporary theatre scholars.
Performance theory
A
sense of crisis with regard to the validity of the ritual theories of
origin probably underlies Richard Schechner's theoretical move, inspired
by Victor Turner's anthropological approach. Schechner claims that there
is no generative link between ritual and theatre, because these are
different reflections of the very same kind of human activity: "performance".
This activity is characterised by the combination of two main elements,
"entertainment" and "efficacy", which in varying
proportions create the continuum of all kinds of performance. This combination
cannot be separated, and even in the extremes of the continuum no single
element [page 124] exists in its
purity; i.e., there is no absolute entertainment or absolute efficacy.(36)
When the element of entertainment outbalances the other, the result
is what is usually called "theatre"; and when the element
of efficacy outbalances the other - it is "ritual". Furthermore,
the proportions between these two elements can be changed at will, according
to the intention of the performer. The implication is that, in contrast
to previous theories, the transition from one extreme to the other is
not unidirectional: just as theatre can change into ritual, so too can
ritual change into theatre. In Schechner's view, theatre - or what he
terms "aesthetic theatre" - achieved its peaks during periods
in which the proportion between these two elements was balanced.(37)
The novelty in his approach resides in that, in contrast to the stiff
categories of "ritual" and "theatre" that characterize
the theories of ritual origin, he suggests the single comprehensive
and dynamic category of "performance".
It
is this comprehensive notion of "performance", which includes
disparate activities such as ritual, football, concerts and theatre,
that compel Schechner to discuss the relationship between two essentially
different elements such as "entertainment" and "efficacy".
He defines "performance" as "an activity done by an individual
or group in the presence of and for the benefit of another individual
or group."(38) This over-abstract definition bears witness to the
problematic nature of this concept, because it creates an artificial
set with such a wide common denominator that it can include almost any
human activity. Moreover, it is composed of activities so different
from each other that its efficacious application is impaired. While
the category of "performance" stands in contrast to "work",
another comprehensive category, and would appear to apply to any kind
of non-instrumental activity, it excludes artistic activities [page
125] akin to theatre, which are not performed in front of
another individual or group (spectators), such as painting, making films
and writing fiction (with the latter describing similar fictional worlds).
Furthermore, this definition of "performance" excludes non-artistic
kinds of activity, whose affinity to theatre is clear and amply demonstrated,
such as imaginative children's play or day-dreaming; and includes activities
without any connection to theatre, such as the efforts of a fire brigade
to rescue people from a burning building, performed before of a group
of curious bystanders, for the sake of the potential victims. One could
go to extremes and claim that even ritual is excluded from this definition,
since the participation of the community constitutes an integral part
of the activity of the shaman, as part of the collective effort for
the benefit of the patient, and not for those watching the performance.
No
less important is to understand how Schechner characterizes "entertainment"
and "efficacy". For "entertainment" he suggests
the following elements: fun, only for those there, emphasis now, performer
knows what s/he's doing, audience watches, audience appreciates, criticism
flourishes and individual creativity. For "efficacy" he suggests:
results, link to an absent other, symbolic time, performer possessed,
in trance, audience participates, audience believes, criticism discouraged,
collective creativity.(39) Close examination reveals that most of these
reiterate the antinomies traditionally employed for distinguishing between
theatre and ritual. For example, on the level of audience: "watching"
vs. "participation", or "appreciation" (or critical
attitude) vs. "belief"; and on the level of creativity: "awareness"
vs, "trance" and "individual creativity" vs. "collective
creativity".(39) The validity of these antinomies is doubtful,
because they presuppose that ritual and theatre are activities in the
same sphere. Schechner's main innovation resides in the distinction
between "fun" (a synonym of "entertainment") and
[page 126] "results" (a
synonym of "efficacy"); but this antinomy is invalid too,
because it creates a contrast between a kind of audience response (delight)
and a kind of effect in the divine sphere - the "absent other",
which is an addressee additional to those of a community of participants
and a theatre audience.
Instead
of Schechner solving the problem of the relationship between ritual
and theatre, questions multiply. For example, does virutally pure "entertainment"
exhaust the nature of aesthetic theatre? Is theatricality enhanced the
more it reaches the pole of "entertainment"? Does the category
of "entertainment" apply to all dramatic genres? What about
subversive kinds of theatre, whose main aim is to baffle and even shock
audiences? In fact, by means of the category of "entertainment"
Schechner restricts a medium, which can serve any purpose, including
contrasting ones, to a single purpose; and reduces its functional ability
as a system of collective thinking and experiencing. Moreover, as mentioned
above, even at the theatre end of the alleged continuum the element
of efficacy is not totally absent. Therefore, we may ask, what is the
link to the "absent other" in a play such as Molière's
Les Fourberies de Scapin? And the opposite question: whom does
the shaman (in his genuine act) entertain and by what means? Is he entertaining
the believers participating in the ritual or the patient? The same difficulty
arises with the notion of "efficacy": although it can be applied
to both ritual and theatre, the meaning will be different in each of
these domains. Whereas the efficacy of the shaman refers to the sphere
of the spirits (the "absent other") or the cure of the patient,
the efficacy of the actor refers to his ability to portray the fictional
world and arouse an expected cognitive and affective response in the
audience. These are not the only questions.
In
understanding the notion of "performance" the term "actual"
is of paramount importance. Schechner claims that all kinds of performance
are "actuals". The intention is that [page
127] what is performed does not represent anything, but is
identical with itself, it is here and now; i.e., it is self-referential.
In this sense, the term "actual" contrasts the term "mimetic"
(and, to be more accurate, "iconic"). It would appear that
an activity that involves representation and an activity that avoids
it exclude each other. In fact, Schechner too concedes that even aesthetic
theatre maintains both the representing function of theatre and its
actual character. When considered from the viewpoint of performance
the "actual" aspects are: audience gathering (before
the performance); performing (anything that calls the audience's
attention to the mechanism of performing the stage text, in particular
the actor as performing a description of a character); and audience
dispersing (after the performance). The implication is that the
existence of an element of representation does not contradict "actuality",
and that these can be complementary to each other and a matter of perspective.
Schechner's contention is also problematic because all known kinds of
ritual employ systems of representation, mainly natural language. In
principle, therefore, their use of a theatre medium is also possible.
I believe, as I have suggested elsewhere, that we should use the category
of "actual" for some kinds of art (which do not use a system
of representation), including some kinds of what is now called "performance
art".(40) However, although the "actual" elements of
theatre can be discerned, it is not those that define this art. The
cancellation of the principles of theatre representation would transform
the performance into something else.
Consistent
with his own approach, Schechner suggests instead of mimetic acting,
which is closer in nature to the ritual pole of the continuum, the possibility
of "transformational" acting:
I suggest that if the principle of theatre
representation is involved, the so-called "transformational acting"
cannot count as a kind of acting. An actor performs a description of
a character, mainly by means of iconic (and conventional) signs, which
he imprints on his own body, in the capacity of material that enables
communication of mental images. Without the actor's body, as a medium,
the spectators could not perceive these images because of their immaterial
nature. Moreover, this descriptive text, imprinted on the actor's body,
refers to a character, a fictional entity. In the absence of a system
of representation a performer in front of an audience refers only
to himself; i.e., he is self referential; he is only an actual. In contrast,
an actor refers both to a character and to himself (as a producer of
a theatre text, as a person whose profession is being an actor); i.e.,
he refers also to himself. This duality characterizes "aesthetic
theatre" in general and is never overlooked by the audience. Applause
at the end of a theatre performance offers clear evidence to this: the
audience (unless naïve) does not applaud the [page
129] characters, but the quality of the actors' performance.
With
regard to the nature of participation, following his own two-directional
model, Schechner claims that the transition from theatre to ritual takes
place when a group of distinct individuals changes into a community
of participants.(43) This claim reflects inversely the claim of the
CSA on the transition from ritual to theatre. As suggested above, the
problem is that "participation" also characterizes all kinds
of theatre, while its nature essentially differs from ritual participation.
Whereas in ritual participation is a condition for the success of the
ritual act, in theatre the audience participates in a process of collective
thinking in the concrete terms of the stage. Among other things, in
the capacity of medium, theatre can describe a community of participant
believers, either in their success or frustration, something that is
precluded in ritual. Consequently, since it is a question of participation
on different levels, the transition from one kind to another is precluded.
Schechner
acknowledges the affinity of its own theory to that of the CSA, despite
the latter's theoretical failure. In particular, he mentions its profound
influence on the modern (and one should add post-modern) theatre practice
and on the manner dramatic works of millennia are now re-considered,
especially ancient Greek drama.(44) In principle, he also accepts elements
from the shamanist theory, particularly its conception of the shaman
as the prototype of the performer, including the actor.(45) Nonetheless,
in contrast to his own declarations of allegiance, Schechner makes a
crucial theoretical move that essentially negates both schools altogether:
"I am not going to replace the Cambridge origin theory with my
own. Origin theories are [page 130] irrelevant
to understanding theater. "[...]there is no reason to hunt for
'origins' or 'derivations'."(46) Schechner's theory thus constitutes
a deadly blow to all ritual theories of theatre origin, because, if
ritual and theatre are essentially the same, being two expressions of
the same combination of elements, no relationship of derivation or generation
can exist between them. Schechner's approach reflects the need for an
alternative theory. The problem is that he attempts to solve the issue
by eliminating the excellent distinction between "ritual"
and "theatre", and suggesting the alternative, feeble distinction
between "entertainment" and "efficacy", which conforms
with neither intuition nor experience. Moreover, in Schechner view (aesthetic)
theatre cannot avoid including elements that mainly characterize ritual;
therefore, instead of their relationship being diachronic it becomes
synchronic; i.e., because ritual and theatre can reflect in different
proportions the very same elements, these actually coexist.
In
my view, the persistent willingness to see theatre as reflecting the
existence of elements that also characterize ritual, despite harsh criticism,
is puzzling, to say the least. The question to be asked, therefore,
is what is the charm in linking theatre to ritual? Obviously, there
is nothing that can be learned about the origin of the theatre medium
from all the theories that presuppose such a link; in particular Schechner's
theory, since he denies the question itself. However, one can at least
perceive his awareness of the inadequacy of all theories of ritual origin,
especially their methodological approaches, which also underlie his
own theory of relationship between ritual and theatre.